On December 20th, 2024, three controversial amendments passed in Taiwan, sparking protests and inspiring speculation that the KMT is trying to sabotage the central government and open the gates for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

First is an amendment to Taiwan’s Constitutional Court Procedure Act, which has already made constitutional reviews impossible until more judges are appointed to the bench of the Constitutional Court – a decision ultimately up to the KMT-TPP controlled legislature that passed it.

Second is an amendment to The Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures, which will reallocate an estimated extra 11 billion USD in tax revenue from the central government to local governments.

And third is an amendment to the Civil Servants Election And Recall Act, which will make impeachment petitions no longer anonymous.

There has been a heated response.

“Why are [the KMT] trying to paralyze the Constitutional Court?” activist Li Minzhe can be heard saying in an Instagram reel of soundbites from a December 18th protest. “Because it holds parliament (the Legislative Yuan) accountable – because the Constitutional Court can overturn bills that are unconstitutional.

“Why are they trying to take away our right to impeachment? Because impeachment is how the people hold parliament accountable, and the KMT doesn’t want to be accountable to the people.

“What are they trying to do? They’re trying to eliminate Taiwan’s submarine budget, and get rid of Taiwan’s national defense. They’re trying to get rid of all civil defense budgets, so that we’re psychologically defenseless to the CCP.”

So how much of this is true? What exactly will these amendments do? And what is the other side to the story?

Background

Like the United States and many other Western democracies, Taiwan is a two party system, made up of the pro-China-leaning Kuoming Tang (KMT), and the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

Also like the US, Taiwan’s government is composed of branches – including the executive, legislative, and judicial, plus an additional two examination and control branches – in place to provide a system of checks and balances to ensure that no one group wields too much power.

While the DPP has dominated presidential elections (the executive branch) for the past three election cycles, the KMT not only holds the most seats in the Legislative Yuan, but has also formed an alliance with the third largest seat holder, the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), giving the two joint control over the legislature.

Specifically, of the 113 seats of the Legislative Yuan, the DPP currently holds 51, the KMT 54 (including two legislators who aren’t currently party members); and the TPP 8 – meaning the DPP holds 51 seats and the KMT-TPP alliance holds 64. If the DPP and the TPP can ally themselves, however, this will give them 59 seats – enough to outvote the KMT’s 54.

Amendment #1: Paralyzing the Constitutional Court

How does the judiciary check the legislature in a branch system like this? By overturning laws it deems unconstitutional through constitutional reviews. In Taiwan, this function is performed by the Constitutional Court (憲法法庭).

How, then, will all of this change as a result of the amendment to The Constitutional Court Procedure Act, which was passed on December 20?

Let’s follow the paper trail.

Redefining “Total Justices”

The key is in the amendment to article 4, which redefines the term “current total grand justices” (大法官現有總額) as “the number of grand justices defined by article 5 of The Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China,” according to an “agenda related document” (議案關係文書) available on the Legislative Yuan’s website.

This is a subtle change with rippling repercussions.

Grand justices refers to the justices of the Constitutional Court; and this term appears repeatedly throughout the Constitutional Court Procedure Act in a variety of contexts.

Before the amendment to article 4, the term was interpreted as “the number of grand justices currently on the bench.” Post-amendment, it has been redefined to mean exactly 15 justices – the number of grand justices article 5 of The Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China specifies the Constitutional court can have.

So in short, a term that appears throughout this act has been subtly changed from meaning “all the justices on the bench” to “the maximum number of justices that can sit on the bench” – or “15.”

This is key for two reasons. First, there can be fewer than the maximum number of grand justices on the bench at a given time – like right now. Second, while it is up to the executive branch to nominate grand justices, these nominations are voted on by the legislative branch.

At this moment, for example, there are only 8 grand justices on the bench – and this number won’t change unless the KMT-TPP controlled legislature agrees to appoint new judges nominated by their rivals in the executive branch, the DPP – specifically, by president Lai Ching-Te.

Deliberation and Decision Thresholds

This new definition also has ramifications for article 30, which specifies how many grand justices must be present for cases to be deliberated in the Constitutional Court, as well as how many votes are required to reach a decision.

Both pre and post-amendment, article 30 states that two thirds of the “total grand justices” must be present to deliberate cases. Once “total grand justices” was redefined, however, the clause took on a new meaning.

Originally, it meant that of the 8 grand justices, 6 must be present for deliberations to occur; now 10 must be present. That’s right, not 8 out of 10, but 10 out of 8 – an impossible number – meaning the Constitutional Court now can’t even meet to deliberate.

That’s not all. There has also been an explicit amendment to article 30, through which the threshold of votes needed to reach a decision in a constitutional review has been raised from over half to two thirds.

Even if article 30 hadn’t been changed, with the change to article 4, this would have meant that all 8 justices would need to reach a unanimous decision for it to be upheld. With this additional change, however, the threshold has again been changed to an impossible number: 9* out of 8 – not that it matters if they can’t convene.

Make no mistake, though, it will matter even if the court is eventually able to convene again, as fewer cases will be settled and more will be hung.

Preliminary Injunction Threshold

It’s the same story for article 43 regarding preliminary injunctions.

In this context, a preliminary injunction refers to the Constitutional Court’s ability to suspend a law suspected of being unconstitutional while it is still under review, essentially as a means of damage control.

Again, two thirds of justices need to be present for deliberation to take place – which has gone from meaning 6 out of 8 to 10 – and again, the number of votes needed to reach a decision has been changed from over half to two thirds, or 9.

No New Justices

To rectify the problem, shortly after the amendment passed, President Lai took swift action and nominated 7 new justices to the Constitutional Court.

On December 24, 2024, however, the legislature equally swiftly rejected all 7.

For 6 of the 7 candidates, all 52 DPP legislators voted in favor of the nominations while all 64 KMT and TPP legislators voted opposed; and for the 7th candidate, the DPP and KMT unanimously voted opposed, while the TPP unanimously voted in favor, as shown by this PTS infographic.

As it stands, as long as the KMT-TPP joint majority in the Legislative Yuan refuses to let nominations through, they can pass whatever laws and amendments they want unchecked by the constitution. In other words, just as Li Mingzhe predicted, they have effectively paralyzed the Constitutional Court.

As demonstrated by the 7th nominee, Liu Ching-Yi, however, the DPP could potentially get judges on the bench and the court up and running again by voting with the TPP, but chose in this case not to.

It’s also worth noting that legislators often vote unanimously with their party – and if they don’t, they can risk losing party membership. In this case, for example, minority leader Ker Chien-ming threatened to expel anyone who voted for Liu from the DPP, according to Central News Agency (CNA).

As of January 2nd, President Lai has approved a motion for reconsideration for this amendment, which has been passed off to the Legislative Yuan, according to United Daily News (UDN) – though, as TPP legislator Chang Chi-kai is quoted saying, “Anyone with a brain knows that the motion isn’t going to pass.”

The KMT’s Defense

While KMT and TPP politicians have put forth arguments and precedence in favor of requiring more grand justices be present at deliberation and a higher vote threshold, neither party has defended paralyzing the Constitutional Court.

As of the 26th, however, KMT legislator Lai Shyh-bao has acknowledged this fact indirectly by saying that their side “won’t discount” surrounding the Judicial Yuan if the grand justices try to convene, according to a PTS article.

What the Other Branches are Saying

As of a December 20th press release, the Judicial Yuan has also acknowledged that these amendments do indeed make it impossible for the Constitutional Court to convene under the current circumstances, and has criticized the amendments for making it impossible for citizens to seek recourse over matters of their constitutional rights.

As of a December 21st press release, Executive Yuan Premier Cho Jung-tai (and DPP member) has responded in similar kind, adding that the Constitutional Court is the only institution in place with the final say to settle constitutional reviews in case of an institutional abuse of power.

Amendment #2: Taking From the National and Giving to the Local

Ranking second in terms of controversy is the amendment to The Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures.

This amendment is set to funnel an estimated extra $11 billion USD (375.3 billion yuan) from Taiwan’s central government to local governments at the city and county levels, according to a PTS report, which accounts for 9% of the central government’s total annual revenue, according to another article.

Li Minzhe’s accusation that this is an attempt to make Taiwan defenseless to the CCP can be seen echoed throughout the corners of Taiwanese social media. And like Li Mingzhe, many others have linked this theory to a KMT-lead proposal to eliminate $60 million USD (2 billion yuan) from the Ministry of National Defense’s (MND) submarine budget.

Central to the argument is the fact that a slashing of the central government’s income could affect the national defense budget.

Currently, it has been estimated that as a result of this amendment, 28% of the central government’s 2026 budget will have to be cut, Executive Yuan “Directorate General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics,” Chen Suzi (DPP) is cited saying in another PTS article.

Chen has likewise specified that this 28% originally would have gone to national defense, the metro system, universal health insurance, and various subsidy programs, and that this reallocation will either have to come at the expense of the defense budget, or hit other areas even harder.

The DPP politicians in these offices do not, however, seem to be explicitly accusing the KMT of trying to sabotage national defense.

KMT legislator Lin Szu-ming, meanwhile, has pointed out that the government has had surpluses in the billions for each of the past few years, including a surplus of $15 billion USD (500 billion yuan) this year alone, implying that this reallocation of $11 billion USD is therefore unlikely to have a significant impact.

Amendment #3: Registration for Impeachment Ballots

Finally, we have the amendment to the Civil Servants Election And Recall Act.

Much of the controversy surrounding this amendment was in response to changes that would raise the threshold for impeachment.

Specifically, an amendment to article 5 would have made it so that civil servants couldn’t be impeached unless they received more votes in favor of impeachment than they did for election, as well as made them immune from impeachment their first year in office, according to PTS.

These changes were not, however, deliberated during the final reading of the amendment, as the preliminary deliberation was only 3 minutes long, and was undertaken while the KMT had the DPP locked out of the Internal Administration Committee, according to The Reporter; for this reason, the amendment to article 5 will be put under a “freeze” for at least a month before second and final readings can be undertaken.

Among changes that were passed, however, include amendments to articles 76, 79, 80, 83, and 98-2, which will require impeachment petitioners to provide photocopied photo ID, PTS writes, and also raise the penalties for fraud.

Two Lockouts and A Brawl

The three amendments have been made even more controversial by the two lockouts and brawl that took place at the Legislative Yuan surrounding the deliberations – though, it’s worth noting that this is far from the first of such occurrences.

The inciting incident appears to have been the lockout on December 16 during the preliminary deliberation of the amendment to the Civil Servants Election And Recall Act.

According to PTS, KMT party members locked DPP legislators out of the deliberation room of the Legislative Yuan on the 16th prior to the deliberation by piling tables in front of the building’s entrances and covering the Internal Administration Committee entrance with plastic wrap.

After that, the DPP staged their own lockout by breaking in through a window on the 19th, and then locking the doors from the inside and barricading them with chairs – specifically to prevent the KMT-TPP alliance from undertaking second and final readings on the amendments on the 20th, according to The Reporter.

Once the KMT had forced their way back into the building and physically cleared the podium of occupying DPP members, pushing and shoving broke out, and legislators on both sides were injured.

While it isn’t clear why the KMT would lock the DPP out of the Legislative Yuan on the 16th when they would have been able to outvote them anyway, it’s plausible that this was a preemptive measure in anticipation that the DPP might try to stop the amendments from passing by alternative, as they did on the 20th.

Conclusions

Protests

In response to the three amendments, civilian organizations including the Economic Democracy Union organized marches across Taipei on December 18th, 19th, and the 20th, including the one Li Minzhe’s was recorded speaking at.

According to organizers, there was a turnout of 6,000 marchers on the 18th; over 10,000 on the 19th; and over 20,000 on the evening of the 20th – the day the amendments passed – according to The Reporter.

My Analysis

Since the 20th, Taiwanese social media has been inundated with breakdowns of these three amendments. Many have simply repackaged more conservative, less sensational takes, similar to what DPP Kaohsiung legislator Huang Jie said in this December 19th social media post.

“...There are only 8 judges on the bench; this [amendment] is akin to abolishing the Constitutional Court, leaving the people with nowhere to turn when their constitutional rights are violated…

“...[This new impeachment] threshold will take away the people’s last line of defense against bad legislators…”

“If the KMT takes 600 billion yuan ($18 billion USD) from the central government’s budget, this could result in major cuts for national defense…”

Others have been closer to Li Mingzhe’s sentiments, and even tried to draw similarities between these amendments and the events leading up to Hong Kong’s Anti-Extradition Movement, such as this post, which says that “the reason the Anti-Extradition [Amendments] were so bad is because they compromised the independence of the legislature.”

In my opinion, while the KMT and TPP have indeed intentionally paralyzed the constitutional court, I don’t see evidence that they plan to use this hole they’ve bored into the system to usher in a Chinese takeover.

Instead, it seems more likely they’re just frustrated with the degree of control the DPP holds through the judiciary and executive branches, and are attempting to force President Lai to nominate judges they approve of in a grab for power.

That said, I think holding the Constitutional Court hostage and flagrantly giving themselves unchecked power shows disdain for the constitutional rights of the Taiwanese people and inspires poor faith. That coupled with the KMT’s history with Chinese-unification rhetoric (and, of course, authoritarianism), I think both the KMT and the TPP should be put under a microscope until the constitutional court is restored.

As for the amendment to The Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures, I likewise think that there is little evidence that the amendments passed are so unreasonable that they suggest blatant sabotage. And I also don’t see evidence of what Li Mingzhe has said about the KMT trying to get rid of all civil defense budgets, though this may have been hyperbole.

Finally, regarding the amendment to the Civil Servants Election And Recall Act, while it may be an exaggeration to say that the KMT is trying to make itself unaccountable to the people by raising the threshold for impeachment, I’m also confused as to why they’re making the threshold so high.

The last legislator in the past 10 years to be successfully impeached was Chen Bowei of the Taiwan Statebuilding Party (TSP), according to the Central Election Commission. And other than that, the only successful impeachments have been of KMT member and president of the Legislative Yuan Han Kuoyu as mayor of Koahsiung in 2020, and the DPP’s own Wang Haoyu as councilor in 2021.

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